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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with distributions of income and the ordering of related Lorenz curves. By 
introducing appropriate preference relations on the set of Lorenz curves, two alternative axiomatic 
characterizations of Lorenz curve orderings are proposed. Moreover, the Gini coefficient is recognized 
to be rationalizable under both axiom sets; as a result, a complete axiomatic characterization of the 
Gini coefficient is obtained. Furthermore, axiomatic characterizations of the extended Gini family and 
an alternative "generalized" Gini family of inequality measures are proposed.  
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1. Introduction 
Analyses of income distribution focus both on the level of income and relative income differences, i.e. 
on the size and the division of the cake. In applied work the standard approach is to separate these two 
dimensions and use the Lorenz curve as a basis for analysing the relative income differences. By 
displaying the deviation of each individual income share from the income share that corresponds to 
perfect equality, the Lorenz curve captures the essential descriptive features of the concept of 
inequality. The normative aspects of Lorenz curve orderings have been discussed by Kolm (1969, 
1976a, 1976b), Sen (1973), and Atkinson (1970) who demonstrated that Lorenz curve orderings of 
distributions with equal means may correspond to social welfare orderings. The assumption of equal 
means, however, limits the applicability of their results. Real world interventions that alter the income 
distribution are usually not mean preserving changes; taxes and transfer programs, for example, are 
interventions that decrease and increase the mean level of income. If, in such situations, concern about 
inequality is over relative rather than absolute income differences1, the condition of scale invariance 
has to be introduced. The condition of scale invariance implies that inequality is compatible with the 
representation given by the Lorenz curve. Thus, adopting the Lorenz curve as a basis for judging 
between income distributions means that we are only concerned about the distributional aspects 
independent of the level of mean income. This is in line with common practice in applied economics 
where the Lorenz curve and related summary measures of inequality are used to compare inequality in 
distributions with different mean incomes2. This practice demonstrates that the ordering of Lorenz 
curves in cases of variable mean income is of interest in its own right, irrespective of how we judge a 
possible conflict between the level of mean income and the degree of (in)equality and its implications 
for social welfare.  
 In theories of social welfare it has long been considered very important to decompose social 
welfare with respect to mean income and inequality. The standard approach is to derive this 
decomposition and the related measures of inequality from specified social welfare functions, see e.g. 
Kolm (1969), Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973), and Blackorby and Donaldson (1978) who also proposed 
a method for deriving social welfare functions from given measures of inequality. For a critical 
discussion of the Kolm-Atkinson approach see Sen (1978), and Ebert (1987) who also introduced an 
alternative approach by explicitly taking into account value judgments of the trade-off between mean 
and (in)equality in deriving social welfare functions. As a first step, Ebert (1987) introduced a mean-
independent ordering of income distributions in terms of inequality. Then, to deal with the mean-
equality trade-off an ordering was defined on pairs of mean income and degrees of inequality. 
                                                     
 1 The importance of focusing on relative incomes has been acknowledged since ancient times and was e.g. 
discussed by Plato who proposed that the ratio of the top income to the bottom should be less than four to one 
(see Cowell, 1977). See also Sen's discussion of relative deprivation in the space of income and Smith's (1776) 
discussion of necessities. 
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Moreover, the second ordering was required to be consistent with the first ordering in the sense that 
the distribution with lowest inequality is preferred in comparisons of distributions with equal means. 
Ebert (1987) demonstrated that by combining these two orderings a social welfare ordering is obtained 
and furthermore that the related social welfare functions allow a mean-inequality split-up3.  
 Now, referring to the standard practice of separately comparing the means and Lorenz curves 
of income distributions it appears attractive to represent the distribution by the mean income and the 
Lorenz curve. Thus, following Ebert's two-step approach, orderings defined on Lorenz curves can be 
used as a basis for deriving social welfare orderings and related welfare functions. The starting point is 
to introduce a preference ordering on the set of Lorenz curves as a basis for assessing the degree of 
inequality. Next, combining this ordering with a second ordering defined on pairs of mean income and 
degrees of inequality, a social welfare ordering is obtained.  
 The purpose of this paper is to provide an axiomatic basis for Lorenz curve orderings. 
Judgments concerning trade-off between mean and (in)equality are, however, beyond the scope of the 
paper. Section 2 presents two alternative sets of assumptions concerning a person's preferences over 
Lorenz curves and gives convenient representations of the corresponding preference relations. 
Furthermore, complete axiomatizations of the Gini coefficient, the extended Gini family and a new 
"generalized" Gini family of inequality measures are proposed. Section 3 introduces an alternative 
characterization of first-degree Lorenz dominance as a criterion for inequality aversion to those 
provided by Atkinson (1970) and Yaari (1988).  
2. Representation results 
In this section we shall demonstrate that the problem of ranking Lorenz curves can, formally, be 
viewed as analogous to the problem of choice under uncertainty. In theories of choice under 
uncertainty, preference orderings over probability distributions are introduced as basis for deriving 
utility indexes. In the present context the corresponding point of departure is to assume appropriate 
preference relations on the set of Lorenz curves.  
 The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean μ is defined by 
(1) L u x d F x u
F x u
( ) ( ), .
( )
= ≤
≤
1 0 1μ ≤
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
L is an increasing convex function with range [0,1]. Thus, L can be considered analogous to a convex 
distribution function on [0,1]. 
 
2 See e.g. Atkinson (1970), Coder et al. (1989) and Atkinson et al. (1995) who make intercountry comparisons 
of Lorenz curves allowing for differences between countries in level of income. 
3 See also Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994) who proposed an alternative approach for dealing with the mean-
equality approach. 
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 Now, let L denote the family of Lorenz curves. Note that a convex combination of Lorenz 
curves is a Lorenz curve and hence a member of L. A person's ranking of elements from L may be 
represented by a preference relation  , which will be assumed to satisfy the following basic axioms,  
 
Axiom 1 (Order).   is a transitive and complete ordering on L. 
 
Axiom 2 (Dominance). Let  If  for all  then L , L1 2 ∈L . L (u) L (u)1 2≥ [ ]u 0,1∈ L L1 2 .  
 
Axiom 3 (Continuity). For each  the sets L ,∈L { }L : L L* *∈L   and { }L : L L* *∈L   are closed 
(w.r.t. L1-norm). 
 
 Then it follows by Debreu (1964) that   can be represented by a continuous and increasing 
preference functional V from L to R. Hence, V defines an ordering on the set of all Lorenz curves. In 
order to give the order relation   an empirical content it is necessary to impose further restrictions on 
V. We can obtain convenient and testable representations of   by introducing appropriate 
independence conditions. Specifically, we shall consider the following two axioms, where L-1 is the 
left inverse of L,  and  L− =1 0 0( ) L− =1 1 1( ) .
 
Axiom 4 (Independence). Let L1, L2 and L3 be members of L and let [ ]α ∈ 0,1 .  Then L L1  2  implies 
α α α αL (1 ) L L (1 ) L1 3 2+ − + − .3  
 
Axiom 5 (Dual independence). Let L1, L2 and L3 be members of L and let [ ]α ∈ 0,1 .  Then L L1 2  
implies ( ) ( )α α α αL (1 ) L L (1 ) L11 31 1 21 31 1− − − − − −+ − + − .  
 
 Axioms 4 and 5 correspond to the independence axioms of the expected utility theory and 
Yaari's dual theory of choice under uncertainty, respectively (see Yaari (1987)) and require that the 
ordering is invariant with respect to certain changes in the Lorenz curves being compared. If L1 is 
weakly preferred to L2, then Axiom 4 states that any mixture on L1 is weakly preferred to the 
corresponding mixture on L2. The intuition is that identical mixing interventions on the Lorenz curves 
being compared do not affect the ranking of Lorenz curves; the ranking depends solely on how the 
differences between the mixed Lorenz curves are judged.  
 In order to clarify the interpretation of Axiom 4, consider an example with a tax/transfer 
intervention that alters the shape of the income distributions and leaves the mean incomes unchanged: 
Let F1 and F2 be income distributions with means μ1 and μ2 and Lorenz curves L1 and L2. Now 
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suppose that these distributions are affected by the following tax/transfer reform. First, a proportional 
tax with tax rate 1-α is introduced. Second, the collected taxes are in both cases redistributed 
according to appropriate scale transformations of some distribution function F3 with mean μ3. This 
means that the two sets of collected taxes are redistributed according to the same Lorenz curve. It is 
understood that this redistribution is carried out so as to give equal-sized transfers or transfers that are 
less progressive than a set of equal-sized transfers. Specifically, this means that ( )( ) )(1 133 tFi −− μμα  
is the transfer received by the t-quantile unit of the income distribution Fi. At the extreme, when F3 is a 
degenerate distribution function, the transfers are equal to the average tax (1-α)μi. At the other 
extreme F3 will give all the collected tax to the best well-off unit. After this tax/transfer intervention, 
the inverses of the two income distributions are given by 
(2) ( )α α μ
μ
F t
F t
ii i
−
−
+ − =1 3
1
3
1 1( )
( )
, ,2,  
where  is the left inverse of Fi. Now, it follows readily from (2) that this intervention leaves the 
mean incomes, μ1 and μ2, unchanged. Moreover, (2) implies that the Lorenz curve for Fi after the 
intervention have changed from Li to 
F ti
−1 ( )
(3) ( ) ( )1 1 1
0
1 3
1
3
3μ
α α μ
μ
α α
i
u
i i iF t
F t
dt L u L u i − −+ −


= + − =( )
( )
( ) ( ), , .1 2  
Hence, if L1 is weakly preferred to L2, then Axiom 4 states that the changes in L1 and L2 that follows 
from the above intervention will not affect the ranking of Lorenz curves. 
 Axiom 5 postulates a similar invariance property on the inverse Lorenz curves to that 
postulated by Axiom 4 on the Lorenz curves. The essential difference between the two axioms is that 
Axiom 5 deals with the relationship between given income shares and weighted averages of 
corresponding population shares, while Axiom 4 deals with the relationship between given population 
shares and weighted averages of corresponding income shares. Thus, Axiom 5 requires the ordering 
relation   to be invariant with respect to aggregation of sub-populations across cumulative income 
shares. That is, if for a specific population the Lorenz curve L1 is weakly preferred to the Lorenz curve 
L2, then mixing this population with any other population with respect to the distributions of their 
income shares does not affect the ranking of Lorenz curves. As an illustration, consider a population 
divided into a group of poor and a group of rich where each unit's income is equal to the 
corresponding group mean. In judging between two-points distributions a person who approves Axiom 
4 and disapproves Axiom 5 will be more concerned about the number of poor rather than about how 
poor they are. By contrast, a person who approves Axiom 5 and disapproves Axiom 4 will emphasize 
the size of the poor's income share rather than how many they are.  
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 By restricting to distributions with equal means we see that Axiom 4 can be interpreted as a 
weaker version of Yaari's dual independence axiom. This means that a person who approves Yaari's 
dual independence axiom will always approve Axiom 4. Thus, the result in Theorem 1 can be 
considered as an alternative (and slightly different) version of the representation result of Yaari (1987, 
1988).  
 
THEOREM 1. A preference relation   on L satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if there exists a 
continuous and non-increasing real function p(⋅) defined on the unit interval, such that for all 
 L , L ,1 2 ∈L
(4) L L p(u) d L (u) p(u) d L (u).1 2
0
1
1
0
1
2 ⇔ ≥   
Moreover, p is unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
 
 Proof. Assume that there exists a continuous and non-increasing real function p(⋅) such that (4) 
is true for all  Then by noting that L L1 2, ∈L .
) ,  ( ) ( ) − = − −p(t d L t L t L t L t dp(t) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2
it follows by straightforward verification that   satisfies Axioms 1-4. 
 To prove sufficiency, note that L is a subfamily of distribution functions. Furthermore, it 
follows from Axioms 1-4 that the conditions of Theorem 3 of Fishburn (1982) are satisfied and thus 
that there exists a continuous function p(⋅) satisfying (4) where p(⋅) is unique up to a positive affine 
transformation. It follows from the monotonicity property of Axiom 2 that p(⋅) is nonincreasing. 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 Now, let VP be a functional,  defined by  [ ]VP : ,L→ 0 1 ,
(5)  V L P u d L uP ( ) ( ) ( ) ,= ′
0
1
where P' is the derivative of P, which is a continuously differentiable and concave distribution 
function defined on the unit interval. Theorem 1 demonstrates that a person who supports Axioms 1-4 
will rank Lorenz curves according to the criterion VP. For convenience, and with no loss of generality, 
we assume . This is a normalization condition which ensures that VP has the unit interval as ′ =P ( )1 0
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its range, taking the maximum value 1 if incomes are equally distributed and the minimum value 0 if 
one unit holds all income. Thus, JP defined by 
(6)  J L P u d L uP ( ) ( ) ( ) ,= − ′1
0
1
measures the extent of inequality in an income distribution with Lorenz curve L, when P is the chosen 
preference or weight function4. By choosing P t  it follows directly from (6) and Theorem 1 
that the Gini coefficient is rationalizable under Axioms 1-4. Note that μVP corresponds to the utility 
representation of the "dual theory" of choice under risk proposed by Yaari (1987, 1988) who also 
demonstrated that the absolute Gini difference was rationalizable under the "dual theory". Moreover, 
by choosing appropriate preference functions we can derive attractive alternatives to the Gini 
coefficient which are consistent with Theorem 1. For example, by choosing the following family of P-
functions, 
t t( ) = −2 2
(7)  ( )P t t kk k( ) , ,= − − ≥+1 1 01
we obtain the following family of measures of inequality 
(8)  ( ) ( )
1
k 1
k
0
G (L) 1 k k 1 1 u L(u)du , k 0.−= − + − ≥
The family { }kG  is the extended Gini family of inequality measures, introduced by Donaldson and 
Weymark (1980) and by Kakwani (1980) as an extension of a poverty measure proposed by Sen 
(1976). For a discussion of the extended Gini family, we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 
1983) and Yitzhaki (1983). By exploiting the fact that the Lorenz curve can be considered analogous 
to a cumulative distribution function Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that the subfamily of the extended 
Gini family formed by the integer values of k in (8) uniquely determines the Lorenz curve.5 This 
means that no information is lost when we restrict attention to the integer subscript subfamily of the 
extended Gini family of inequality measures. Further discussion of the relationship between the 
integer subscript subfamily of the extended Gini family and the Lorenz curve is left for the next 
section. 
 As indicated above Axiom 4 is closely related to Yaari's dual independence axiom and can 
thus be considered to be an alternative of the independence axiom that forms the basis of the expected 
                                                     
4 Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of (6) based on descriptive arguments. For alternative  
normative motivations of the JP-family and various subfamilies of the JP-family we refer to Donaldson and 
Weymark (1980, 1983),  Weymark (1981) and Ben Porath and Gilboa (1994). 
5 Actually, Aaberge (2000) demonstrated that the integer subscript subfamily of the extended Gini family is 
uniquely determined by a family of inequality measures which is formed by the moments of the Lorenz curve. 
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utility theory for choice under uncertainty. Another alternative is provided by Axiom 5 which 
postulates independence in terms of the inverse Lorenz curve. While the Lorenz curve only can be 
considered analogous to a distribution function its inverse actually proves to be a distribution function. 
This fact follows from the following expression 
(9)  ( )1 1L (u) F K (u) , 0 u 1,− −= ≤ ≤
where K defined by 
(10) 
y
0
1K(y) x d F(x)=
μ    
is the first-moment distribution. Thus, L-1 is the cumulative distribution of K(Y) where Y is a random 
variable with cumulative distribution function F. By aggregating the ordered incomes, starting with the 
lowest, up to K-1(u) 100u per cent of the total income is included. Hence, L-1(u) can be interpreted as 
the probability that a randomly drawn income from F is equal to or lower than K-1(u). Expression (10) 
of L-1 demonstrates that Axiom 5 postulates a similar invariance on the transformed income 
distributions as the conventional independence axiom of the expected utility theory postulates on the 
income distributions. The essential difference between these axioms emerges in how they treat the 
introduction of a tax reform that exclusively concerns a certain region of a nation. Whilst the 
conventional independence axiom requires the judgment of this reform to be independent of the tax 
structure and distribution of incomes in the remaining part of the country, Axiom 5 assumes that the 
judgment of the reform depend on the income structure outside the region as well as on the 
distributional consequences of the reform. 
 Now, by replacing Axiom 4 with Axiom 5 in Theorem 1, we obtain the following alternative 
representation result. 
 
THEOREM 2. A preference relation   on L satisfies Axioms 1-3 and Axiom 5 if and only if there 
exists a continuous and non-decreasing real function q(⋅) defined on the unit interval, such that for all 
 L , L ,1 2 ∈L
(11) ( ) ( )L L q L (u) du q L (u) du1 2
0
1
1
0
1
2 ⇔ ≥  .  
Moreover, q is unique up to a positive affine transformation.  
 
 Proof. It follows from (1) that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Lorenz curve 
and its inverse. Hence, the ordering relation   defined on the set of inverse Lorenz curves is 
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equivalent to the ordering relation defined on L. Note that  for all  if and only 
if  for all . Then, by replacing Axiom 4 with Axiom 5, Theorem 2 follows 
directly from Theorem 1 where the ordering representation is given by 
L u L u1
1
2
1− −≤( ) ( )
)L u du( ) .
Q t d L t( ) ( ) ,′ −1
JQ
*
)L u du( )
t t( ) = 2
,0  
u)du , k 0,≥
[u ∈ 0 1,
=) 0
]
]
,
L u L u1 2( ) ( )≥
Q
*
[u ∈ 0 1,
Q
*
Q
*
  (
0
1
1
0
1
 − =q t d L t q( ) ( )
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Now, let VQ
*  be a functional,  defined by [ ]VQ* : ,L→ 0 1
(12)  ( )V L Q L u du( ) ( )= ′ = 
0
1
0
1
where Q' is the derivative of Q, a continuous and convex distribution function defined on the unit 
interval. It follows from Theorem 2 that VQ
*  represents preferences that satisfy Axioms 1-3 and 5. The 
implication is that a person whose preferences satisfy Axioms 1-3 and 5 will choose among Lorenz 
curves so as to maximize V . Further restrictions on the preferences can be introduced through the 
preference function Q. For normalization purposes we impose the condition Q ( . This condition 
implies that V
′ 0
 has the unit interval as its range, taking the maximum value 1 if incomes are equally 
distributed and the minimum value 0 if one unit holds all income. Thus,  defined by 
(13)  (J L QQ* ( ) = − ′1
0
1
measures the extent of inequality in an income distribution with Lorenz curve L when social 
preferences are consistent with Axioms 1-3 and 5. By choosing Q  in (11) it follows that J Q
*  
coincides with the Gini coefficient. Surprisingly, there seem to be no proposals of alternatives to the 
Gini coefficient that are consistent with Theorem 2. However, by specifying appropriate preference 
functions in (13) we can derive measures of inequality which are consistent with Theorem 2. For 
example, by introducing the following family of preference functions 
(14) Q t t kk
k( ) ,= ≥+1
we obtain the following related family of inequality measures 
(15)  ( )
1
* k
k
0
G (L) 1 k 1 L (= − + 
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where *1G  is the Gini coefficient.  
 As mentioned above L-1 can be considered as a distribution function. Thus, the inverse Lorenz 
curve is uniquely determined by its moments, which means that the Lorenz curve can be recovered 
from the knowledge of { }*kG (L) : k 1,2,...= which we will denote the inverse Lorenz family of 
inequality measures. The inequality aversion properties of the -measures will be examined in the 
next section.  
JQ
*
 Note, however, that J Q
* -measures can be viewed as a sum of weighted population shares, 
where the weights depend on the functional form of the Lorenz curve in question and thereby on the 
magnitude of the income shares. By contrast, JP-measures can be viewed as a sum of weighted income 
shares, where the weights depend on population shares rather than income shares. Hence, these 
weights do not depend on the magnitudes of the income shares, but merely on the rankings of income 
shares. Now, let us return to the above discussion of two-points distributions in the context of Axioms 
4 and 5. Note that the effect on JP-measures of increasing the income share of the poor depends solely 
on the relative number of poor irrespective of their share of income, while a similar effect on JQ
* -
measures depends both on the poor's share of the population and their incomes. In contrast, the effect 
on J Q
* -measures of an increase in the relative number of poor depends merely on the poor's share of 
the incomes, while the effect on JP-measures depends both on the poor's share of population and 
income. 
 Postulating further conditions on the ordering relations, in addition to Axioms 1-4 and Axioms 
1-3 and 5, respectively, will allow us to demonstrate that it is possible to obtain axiomatizations of the 
extended Gini family defined by (8) and the alternative "generalized" Gini family defined by (15). To 
this end it will be convenient to introduce the Lorenz curves La,b, defined by 
(16) [ ) [ ]L u
u a
b u a
a
a u a and b
u
a b, ( )
,
, , ,
,
=
<
−
−
≤ < ∈ ∈
=



0
1
1 0 1 0
1 1
,1  
and the related family ~L
)
 of these curves is defined formally by 
[ [ ]{ }~ : , ,,L = = ∈L L L a and ba b 0 1,∈ 0 1 . Note that ~L  for a b, ,∈ 0 1  represents distributions for which 
the population is divided into three groups, where one group (100a per cent of the population) has zero 
income, the second group contains just one unit holding 100 (1-b) per cent of the total income, while 
the units of the third group receive equal shares of the remaining 100b per cent of the income. Now, 
assuming that preferences consistent with Axioms 1-4 also satisfy Axiom 5 for all L ∈~L
L
 and 
alternatively that preferences consistent with Axioms 1-3 and 5 satisfy Axiom 4 for all ∈~L , the 
following representation results are obtained. 
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 THEOREM 3. A preference relation   on L satisfies Axioms 1-4 for all  and Axiom 5 for all L ∈L
L ∈ ~L  if and only if there exists a positive real number k such that for all  L , L1 2 ,∈L
 ( ) ( )L L 1 u d L (u) 1 u d L (u).1 2
0
1
k
1
0
1
k
2 ⇔ − ≥ −   
Moreover, the representation is unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
 
THEOREM 4. A preference relation   on L satisfies Axioms 1-3 and 5 for all  and Axiom 4 for 
all 
L ∈L
L ∈ ~L  if and only if there exists a positive real number k such that for all  L , L1 2 ∈ ,L
 ( ) ( )L L L (u) du L (u) du.1 2
0
1
1
k
0
1
2
k ⇔ ≥   
Moreover, the representation is unique up to a positive affine transformation. 
 
 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4. The necessary parts of Theorems 3 and 4 follow by 
straightforward verification. To prove sufficiency, note that Theorems 1 and 2 imply that there exists a 
continuous and non-increasing real function p(⋅), a continuous and non-decreasing real function q(⋅) 
and a monotone real function Ψ(⋅), such that 
(17)  ( )
0
1
0
1
 = 


 ∈p(u d L u q L u du L) ( ) ( )
~ .Ψ for all L
Hence, inserting for L ∈~L  (17) equals 
(18) ( ) [ ) [ ]Ψ 1 1
1
0 1 0 1−

 =
−
−
∈ ∈a Q b
b
b P a
a
a b( ) ( ) , ,for all and .
1 .
 
where  and P  Without loss of generality we introduce the following 
suitable normalization,  and  Then, (18) 
yields 
Q u q t dt
u
( ) ( )= 
0
u p(t dt
u
( ) ) .= 
0
Q( ) ( )0 0 0= =P P Q( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 1 1= = = =Ψ Ψ p( q1 0 0) ( )= =
(19) ( ) [ )Ψ 1 1
1
0 1− = −
−
∈a P a
a
for all a( ) , ,  
and 
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(20) [ ]Ψ Q b
b
b for all b( ) , .

 = ∈ 0 1  
Now, inserting (19) and (20) in (18) we obtain the following equation 
(21) ( ) ( ) [ ]Ψ Ψ Ψ1 1−

 = −



 ∈a
Q b
b
a Q b
b
for all a b( ) ( ) , ,0 1 .  
Note that (21) is equivalent to the functional equation 
(22)  [ ]Ψ Ψ Ψ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,xy x y for all x y= ∈ 0 1
which has the following solution (see e.g. Aczel, 1966),  or 1, or there exists  such that Ψ ≡ 0 r > 0
(23)  [ ]Ψ( ) , .x x for all xr= ∈ 0 1
Inserting (23) into (19) and (20), respectively, the results of Theorems 3 and 4 are obtained. 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 In addition to providing a rationale for the extended Gini family G and the alternative 
"generalized" Gini family G* of measures of inequality, Theorems 3 and 4 demonstrate that G and G* 
are ordinally equivalent on ~L . 
 Although several authors have discussed rationales for the absolute Gini difference (see Sen 
(1974), Hey and Lambert (1980), Weymark (1981) Donaldson and Weymark (1983) and Yaari (1987, 
1988)), for the Gini coefficient (Thon (1982)) and for the absolute Gini differences as well as for the 
Gini coefficient (Ben Porath and Gilboa (1992)), no one has established a rationale for the Gini 
coefficient as a preference ordering on Lorenz curves. Moreover, a complete axiomatic 
characterization of the absolute Gini difference and/or the Gini coefficient has neither been provided. 
However, as was demonstrated above, the Gini coefficient is rationalizable under Axioms 1-4 as well 
as under Axioms 1-3 and 5. Thus, we may conjecture that the Gini coefficient represents the 
preference relation which satisfy Axioms 1-5.  
 
THEOREM 5. A preference relation   on L satisfies Axioms 1-5 if and only if   can be represented 
by the Gini coefficient. 
 
 Proof. The necessary part of the theorem follows by straightforward verification. To prove the 
sufficiency part we observe from the proof of Theorem 3 and 4 that   satisfies Axioms 1-5 for all 
L ∈~L  if and only if 
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(24) ( ) ( )r u d L u
r
L u du r for all Lr r
r
+ − = +







 > ∈ 1 1 1
1 0
0
1
0
1
1( ) ( ) , , ~ ,L  
where equation (24) is established by inserting (16) in (17) and Ψ is given by (23). Now, as (24) has to 
hold for all  we obtain the following equation by inserting L u  in (24), L ∈L u( ) = 2
(25) 2
2
1
2
0
r
r
r
r
r
+
=
+
+



 >, .  
By applying Lemma 1 in Appendix, it follows that equation (25) has a unique solution for . r 1=
 Q.E.D. 
 
 Theorem 5 provides a complete axiomatization for the Gini coefficient. Thus, application of 
the Gini coefficient means that both independence axioms are supported jointly. Hence, the 
preferences of a person whose ethical norms coincide with the Gini coefficient are invariant with 
respect to certain types of tax/transfer interventions and with respect to aggregation of sub-populations 
across income shares. 
 
REMARK. By restricting the comparison of Lorenz curves to distributions with equal means Axioms 
1-5 can be considered to be defined on the set of generalized Lorenz curves rather on the set of Lorenz 
curves6. Thus, in this case the above representation results are valid for generalized Lorenz curves as 
well as for Lorenz curves.  
 
 When the preference relations in Theorems 1 and 2 are defined on the set of distribution 
functions rather on the set of Lorenz curves the representation results in Theorems 1 and 2 coincide 
with the conventional expected utility theory and Yaari's rank-dependent utility theory for choice 
under uncertainty. Thus, it follows from Theorem 5 that risk neutral behavior is completely 
characterized by Axioms 1-5 provided that these axioms are defined on the set of distribution 
functions F. 
 
COROLLARY 1. A preference relation   on F satisfies Axioms 1-5 if and only if   can be 
represented by the mean. 
                                                     
6The generalized Lorenz curve, defined as a mean scaled-up version of the Lorenz curve, was introduced by 
Shorrocks (1983).   
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3. Inequality aversion  
In expected utility theory it is standard to impose restrictions on the utility function applying various 
types of stochastic dominance rules. For example, "risk aversion" is equivalent to second-degree 
stochastic dominance and imposes strict concavity on the utility function. Analogous to the standard 
theory of choice under uncertainty Atkinson (1970) defined inequality aversion as being equivalent to 
risk aversion. This was motivated by the fact that the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is identical to the 
principle of mean preserving spread introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) which is equivalent 
to the condition of dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves when we restrict attention to 
distributions with equal means. These principles may even be used as basis for discussing and 
interpreting cross-country comparisons of Lorenz curves. To perform inequality comparisons with 
Lorenz curves we can deal with distributions of relative incomes or alternatively simply abandon the 
assumption of equal means. The latter approach normally forms the basis of empirical studies and is 
also employed in this paper. 
 An interesting question is what kind of restrictions inequality aversion (dominating non-
intersecting Lorenz curves) places on the preference functions P and Q? Yaari (1988) demonstrated 
that JP defined by (6) supports the criterion of dominating non-intersecting Lorenz curves if and only if 
P is strictly concave. An alternative characterization of the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves 
is provided by Theorem 6. 
 Let Q1 be a class of preference functions related to and defined by JQ
*
[ ]{ }Q1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0= ′ ′′ ′ > ′′Q t, > ∈ ′ =Q Q and Q are continuous on Q t and for t and Q: , ( ) ( ) , , ( ) .  
 
THEOREM 6. Let L1 and L2 be members of L. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
(i)  [ ]L (u) L (u) for all u 0,11 2≥ ∈
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one u 0,1∈  
(ii)  ( ) ( )J L J L for all Q .Q* 1 Q* 2 1< ∈Q
 
(Proof in Appendix.) 
 
 Theorem 6 demonstrates that first-degree Lorenz dominance and thereby inequality aversion is 
characterized by the strict convexity of Q-functions. Alternatively, it can be characterized by the strict 
concavity of P-functions. Based on these results one might expect that a "more concave" P-function or 
a "more convex" Q-function would exhibit more inequality aversion. As was recognized by Yaari 
(1988) and easily can be verified from (6)  displays more inequality aversion than  if P1 lies J P1 J P2
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above P2 and P1 and P2 are concave. Similarly, it follows from (13) that  exhibits more inequality 
aversion than  if Q1 is lying below Q2 and Q1 and Q2 are convex. 
JQ1
*
JQ2
*
 Let P1 be a class of preference functions related to JP and defined by 
[ ]{ }P1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0= ′ ′d P ′ ′ > ′′ < ∈ ′ =P P an are continuous on P t and P t for t and P: , , ( ) ( ) , , ( ) . 
An interesting question is whether the characterization of Lorenz dominance can be achieved for 
smaller classes of preference functions than P1 and Q1. As referred to above Aaberge (2000) 
demonstrated that the subfamily { }kG : k 1,2,...=  of the extended Gini family uniquely determines the 
Lorenz curve. Thus, to characterize Lorenz dominance we may restrict attention to the family of P-
functions defined by (7). Similarly, we may restrict attention to the Q-functions defined by (14) since 
the inverse Lorenz family of inequality measures { }*kG : k 1,2,...=  uniquely determines the inverse 
Lorenz curve and consequently the Lorenz curve. These results are summarized in Theorem 7. 
 
THEOREM 7. Let L1 and L2 be members of L and let Gk and  be defined by (8) and (15), 
respectively. Then the following statements are equivalent, 
*
kG
(i)  for all ≥1 L2L (u) (u) [ ]∈u 0,1  and the inequality holds strictly for at least one ∈u 0,1  
(ii)  for k=1,2,... ( )k 1L <
( )*k 1L <
( )k 2G G L
(iii)  for k=1,2,... ( )*k 2G G L
 
 Note that the most inequality averse JP-measure is obtained as the preference function 
approaches 
(26)  P t
t
ta
( )
,
, .
=
=
< ≤

0 0
1 0 1
As Pa is not differentiable, it is not a member of the family P1 of inequality averse preference 
functions, but it is recognizable as the upper limit of inequality aversion for members of P1. 
 Inserting (26) in (6) yields 
(27) J L FPa ( )
( ) ,= − +
−
1 0
1
μ
 
where μ is the mean income and F-1(0+) is the lowest income. Hence, the inequality measure J  
corresponds to the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion. 
Pa
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 By examining the inequality aversion properties of JQ
* -measures we find that the upper limit 
of inequality aversion is attained as the preference function approaches 
(28)  Q t
t
ta
( )
,
, .
=
≤ <
=

0 0 1
1 1
Inserting (28) in (13) yields 
(29) J L
FQa
* ( )
( )
,= −
−
1
11
μ  
where F-1(1) is the largest income. Thus,  is the upper limit of inequality aversion for members of 
Q1 and is in this respect "dual" to the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion. Thus, we may denote it the 
relative minimax criterion. In contrast to the Rawlsian relative maximin criterion the relative minimax 
criterion focuses on the relative income of the best-off unit. If decisions are based on the relative 
minimax criterion, the income distributions for which the largest relative income is smaller is 
preferred, regardless of all other differences. The only transfers which decrease inequality are transfers 
from the richest unit to anyone else.  
JQa
*
 The two axiomatic based approaches for measuring inequality differ notably with respect to 
their descriptions of the most inequality averse behavior. When evaluation of inequality is based on 
the JP-measures, raising the emphasis on transfers occurring lower down in the Lorenz curve attains 
the most inequality averse behavior. By contrast, if inequality is assessed in terms of JQ
* -measures, 
raising the emphasis on transfers occurring higher up in the Lorenz curve attains the most inequality 
averse behavior. Note that this difference in inequality aversion originates from the difference between 
Axioms 4 and 5. 
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Appendix 
Proofs 
 
LEMMA 1. Let γ be a function on [  defined by )0,∞
 ( )γ (x) x log x 1
x 2
log x 2 log 2.= +
+



 + + −  
Then  is a unique root of x 1= γ ( ) , .x 0 in 0= ∞  
 
 Proof. By straightforward first and second order differentiation of γ(x) we get 
 ′ = +
+



 + + −
−
+
γ ( ) logx x
x
x
x
x
x
1
2 1
1
2
 
and 
 ( ) ( )′′ = −
− −
+ +
γ ( ) .x x x
x x
2
2 2
3
1 2
 
Hence, ( )′′ = = ≡ +γ ( )x if x x0 12 1 131  and 
 [ )′′ > ∈
< ∈

γ ( )
,
, .
x
if x x
if x x
0 0
0
1
1 ∞
 
Thus, γ(x) is convex for  and concave for [ )x x∈ 0 1, x x∈ ∞1, . Moreover, noting that γ ( )0 0=  and 
 γ(x) can at most have one root in ( )γ x1 0> , 0 1, x  and at most one root in x1, ∞ . However, 
observing that γ ( )x > 0  for , we have that x x> 1 > 1 γ ( )x > 0  for all  and thus that  is 
the only root in 
[ )x x∈ ∞1, x = 1
0, ∞ . 
 Q.E.D. 
 
LEMMA 2. Let H be the family of bounded, continuous and non-negative functions on [0,1] which are 
positive on 0,1  and let g be an arbitrary bounded and continuous function on [0,1]. Then 
   > ∈g(t) h(t) dt 0 for all h H
implies 
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  [ ]g(t) 0 for all t 0,1≥ ∈
and the inequality holds strictly for at least one t 0,1∈ . 
 
 The proof of Lemma 2 is known from mathematical textbooks. 
 
Proof of Theorem 6.  To prove the equivalence of (i) and (ii) we use that  for all 
 if and only if  for all . Next, from the definition (11) of 
L u L u1
1
2
1− −≤( ) ( )
JQ
*[u ∈ 0 1, ] ]
>
L u L u1 2( ) ( )≥ [u ∈ 0 1,  and using 
integration by parts it follows that 
  ( ) ( ) ( )J L J L Q t L t L t dtQ Q* * ( ) ( ) ( ) .2 1
0
1
2
1
1
1
− = ′′ − − −
Hence, if (ii) holds then  for all  ( ) ( )J L J LQ Q* *2 1 0− Q ∈Q1 .
 The converse statement follows by straightforward application of Lemma 2. 
 Q.E.D. 
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